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 When the term  culture is used, it refers to something that is both fi xed and fl uid , 
both situated and mobile. That is, culture is fi xed enough that at least some parts 
of it are transmitted over generations, but also fl uid enough that at least some parts 
of it are always evolving and changing as features of the environment change; 
situated enough that we often think of a “ culture ” as strongly associated with 
the population in a specifi c region, but also mobile enough that immigrants can 
bring their “ own culture ” to a  “ different culture. ” With these caveats, culture can 
be operationalized as a set of structures and institutions, values, traditions, and 
ways of engaging with the social and nonsocial world used in a certain time and 
place and transmitted across generations (e.g.,  Shweder  & LeVine, 1984 ). Culture 
can be thought of as a set of societal-level processes (e.g., legal systems, lan-
guages, religions) with societal-level outcomes (e.g., suicide rates, divorce rates, 
fertility rates) ( Oyserman  & Uskul , 2008). Just as importantly, as cross-cultural 
psychologists have noted, these societal-level processes can produce average 
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effects at the individual-level. Our current focus is on this latter part, examining 
culture-relevant  contents ,  procedures , and  motivations at the individual-level. 
Thus, by culture we mean culturally characteristic content (what is relevant, 
moral, central, of consequence), culturally characteristic ways of thinking and 
making sense of oneself, others and the world, and culturally characteristic moti-
vations (e.g., to self-enhance or self-improve, to assert confi dence and leadership 
or not to offend). These elements together constitute that which  “ goes without 
saying, ” that which feels transparent, right, and logical in context. 
 While this feeling of fl uency is a telltale marker that culture is at work, it also 
makes it diffi cult to systematically model all that  “ culture ” is and reduces social 
scientists ’ ability to make predictions about when and how culture matters. To 
take on this challenge, cultural psychologists have developed a number of poten-
tially useful basic organizing constructs to describe and distinguish cultural  “ syn-
dromes. ” These simplifying models are not meant to provide detailed descriptions 
of any particular culture, but rather to highlight systematic patterns that charac-
terize clusters of cultures. Such models are useful to the extent that they set the 
stage for specifi c and testable predictions about culture’s consequences. 
 Proposed cultural syndrome models include contrasts between  “ individual-
istic ” and  “ collectivistic ” (e.g.,  Hofstede, 1980 ),  “ tight ” and  “ loose ” ( Triandis, 
1995 ),  “ horizontal ” and  “ vertical ” ( Triandis  & Gelfand, 1998 ),  “ masculine ” and 
 “ feminine ” ( Hofstede, 1980 ),  “ survival values ” and  “ self-expression values ” 
( Inglehart, 1997 ), and  “ honor-modesty ” and  “ shame ” (e.g.,  Gregg, 2005 ; see 
also  Cohen, 2001 ) focused cultural syndromes. Each of these models sets up a 
contrast between prototypes of opposing cultural processes and has provided 
some predictive insights. Perhaps because it captures salient Western values and 
has some overlap with the other models, the cultural syndrome model that has 
received most research attention is individualism and its assumed opposite col-
lectivism (e.g.,  Triandis, 1995, 2007 ;  Hofstede, 1980, 2001 ;  Kagitçibasi, 1997 ;
 Kashima et al., 2001 ;  Oyserman et al., 2002a ). 
 Although the correlational evidence supports the claims made by individualism 
and collectivism models of culture, without experimental evidence, the process by 
which culture matters remains hidden. In this chapter, our goal is to illuminate 
at least part of this hidden process, focusing on how individualism and collectiv-
ism as cultural syndromes are likely infl uence how we think – cognitive content, 
procedures, and motivations. The chapter is divided into three main parts. To set 
the stage, we fi rst provide a brief summary of the mostly correlational evidence 
that operationalizing culture in terms of individualism and collectivism captures 
some important aspects of cross-cultural difference, drawing on the review of 
 Oyserman et al. (2002a) . This literature focuses mostly on content differences, 
with less emphasis on process and motivation. To address gaps in causal reason-
ing that this correlational evidence cannot address, a situated cognition approach 
to culture is outlined in the second part, and evidence for this model is pre-
sented, drawing on  Oyserman and Lee’s (2007, 2008) review and meta-analysis 
of the culture-priming research. The priming literature has focused on both content 
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and process, but has not really examined culturally characteristic motiv ations. 
Therefore, in the third part of this chapter, we step beyond integrative summary 
to ask what a situated cognition approach to culture says about how culture infl u-
ences cognitive content (what), cognitive process (how), and motivation (for what 
purpose), drawing on the model presented by  Oyserman and Sorensen (in press) .
 INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM 
 OPERATIONALIZATION 
 A main contention of cultural and cross-cultural psychology is that societies dif-
fer in individualism and collectivism and that these differences have consequences 
for what has meaning and value, what is worthy of persistent effort and how we 
make sense of ourselves and others (e.g.,  Schwartz, 1994 ;  Inglehart  & Oyserman, 
2004 ). While much cultural and cross-cultural psychology has emphasized differ-
ences in content of thinking, embedded in this description are differences in both 
content, and motiv ation and style of thinking. More broadly, individualism and 
collectivism can be described as cultural syndromes that place differential empha-
sis on individuals versus social groups (e.g.,  Triandis, 1995 ). Individualism as a 
cultural syndrome focuses on the individual as the basic unit of analysis; societal 
structures are valued to the extent that they support individual happiness; from an 
individ ualistic perspective, groups serve individuals. Collectivism as a cultural 
syndrome focuses on the group as the basic unit of analyses; societal structures 
are valued to the extent that they support preservation and enhancement of group 
resources; from a collectivistic perspective, individuals serve groups. This ini-
tial operationalization suggests differences between collective cultural values of 
group solidarity, social obligation, connection and integration and individualistic 
cultural values of individual freedom, personal fulfi llment, autonomy and separa-
tion – either as directly assessed at the individual-level or as implied by examining 
themes in cultural products such as advertisements, newspapers, text books, fi ction, 
or proverbs. Thus, operationalizations of individualism and collectivism clearly 
emphasize content of thining, but as will be evident in this chapter, cognitive 
processes and motivations are also implicated in these cultural syndromes. 
 IMPLICATIONS OF INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM 
 Content 
 Rather than assess individualism and collectivism directly, researchers often 
rely on prior cross-national typologies, especially that of  Hofstede (1980) .
Alternatively, they assess differences in individualism values and/or collectivism 
values directly in their samples (however, see  Oyserman et al., 2002a ;  Oyserman  &
Uskul , 2008, for a detailed critique of both of these methods). Willingness to 
use these methods implies that individualism and collectivism as cultural 
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syndromes are assumed to most directly implicate differences in content – 
chronically salient values and norms. 
 As outlined by  Oyserman et al. (2002a) , in addition to differences in values, 
other content differences – in relationality, self-concept, well-being, and pro cess 
differences, in motivational or cognitive style, can also be deduced from how indi-
vidualism and collectivism have been operationalized. With regard to the impact of 
cultural syndromes on how relationships are construed, individualism is assumed 
to scaffold the feeling that relationships are chosen, voluntary and changeable, can 
be worked on and improved or left when costs outweigh benefi ts (e.g.,  Triandis, 
1995 ;  Sayle, 1998 ;  Morris  & Leung, 2000 ). Collectivism is assumed to scaffold 
the feeling that important group memberships are ascribed and fi xed  “ facts of life ”
to which people must accommodate; both in-groups and boundaries between in- 
and out-groups are experienced as stable, impermeable, and important. 
 Cultural syndromes are also assumed to infl uence how the self is typically 
construed (e.g.,  Markus  & Kitayama, 1991 ). Theorists assume that individual-
ism sets up the expectation that a basic self-goal is to feel good about oneself 
as a unique and distinctive person and to defi ne these unique features in terms 
of abstract traits. Collectivism, on the other hand, sets up the expectation that 
a basic self-goal is to attain and maintain group membership, so that the self 
is defi ned both in terms of one’s social roles (e.g., middle daughter) and group 
memberships (e.g., Hong Kong Chinese) and the traits and abilities relevant for 
maintaining these (e.g., loyalty, energetic perseverance). 
 With regard to well being, individualism implies that open emotional expres-
sion and attainment of one’s personal goals are important sources of well-being 
and life satisfaction (e.g.,  Diener  & Diener, 1995 ). Collectivism implies that suc-
cessfully carrying out social roles and obligations and avoiding gaffs or failures 
in these domains are important sources of well-being and life satisfaction, mak-
ing emotional restraint important as a way to successfully carry out one’s social 
obligations ( Markus  & Kitayama, 1991 ;  Kim et al., 1994 ;  Kwan et al., 1997 ).
 Cognitive Processes 
 With regard to cognitive style or chronically salient cognitive procedures, 
because the de-contextualized self is assumed to be a stable, causal nexus, indi-
vidualism implies that focus is generally oriented toward the person rather than 
the situation or social context (see also  Miller, 1984 ;  Newman, 1993 ;  Morris  &
Peng, 1994 ;  Choi et al., 1999 ). Thus, individualism promotes a de-contextualized 
reasoning style that assumes social information is not bound to social context. 
This has been described as a  “ separate-and-pull-apart ” style as opposed to a situ-
ation-specifi c relational  “ embed-and-connect ” style ( Markus & Oyserman, 1989 ;
 Oyserman et al., 2002b ). In contrast, collectivism as a cultural syndrome gen-
erally implies that social context, situational constraints and social roles fi gure 
prominently in person perception and causal reasoning ( Miller, 1984 ;  Morris  &
Peng, 1994 ); that meaning is contextualized and memory is likely to contain 
richly embedded details. 
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 Motivation 
 While less prominent in the literature, a number of cross-cultural research-
ers also emphasized motivation differences. A number of studies have focused 
on differential salience of self-concept goals (e.g., self-enhancement or self-
improvement,  Heine, 2005 ). An emerging focus is on difference in the salience 
of relationality goals (e.g., modesty or “ not offend others, ”  Yamagishi  & Suzuki , 
in press). 
 EVIDENCE FROM CROSS-CULTURAL 
RESEARCH
 VALUES 
 Prior research used values as a key to the operationalization of  “ culture ”,
assuming that individualistic cultural groups should endorse more individualistic 
values and collectivist cultural groups should endorse more collectivist values. 
As shown in a recent thorough review and meta-analytic synthesis ( Oyserman
et al., 2002a ), there is consistent evidence for such difference. With regard to 
cultural differences in chronically accessible basic values, their meta-analysis 
shows signifi cant differences in endorsement of individualism values (e.g., personal 
independence and uniqueness) and collectivism values (e.g., group membership 
and group pro cesses). On average Anglo Americans endorse values of individ-
ualism more and values of collectivism less than Africans, Eastern Europeans, 
Asians, and Asian Americans. Results are integrated and displayed graphically 
in  Figure 11.1 . 
 In addition to this generally confi rming picture,  Oyserman et al. (2002a) 
reported some interesting caveats. The meta-analysis suggests that although 
Anglo Americans and individuals from other English-speaking countries do not 
differ in individualism and collectivism, they differ from Western Europeans. 
Anglo Americans are lower in collectivism than Western Europeans, with 
effects similar to those found in comparisons with Asians. However, while dif-
ferences between Anglo Americans and Asians of Chinese heritage (including 
Asian Americans) are robust, differences between Anglo Americans and other 
Asians are often small and sensitive to differences in scale content and reliabil-
ity. Moreover, Anglo Americans and African Americans do not differ in individ-
ualism and African Americans are lower in collectivism, suggesting that African 
Americans are in some important ways quintessential Americans. These results 
challenge the notion of a single “ Western ” culture, the simplistic approach of 
contrasting “ East vs. West, ” and the assumption that high individualism and low 
collectivism is part of a Western European tradition brought to America and most 
accessible to Anglo Americans. Rather there seems to be a uniquely Anglo and 
American way of being (high individualism and low collecti vism) common to 
Americans whether claiming Anglo-European or African descent. These results 
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thus suggest a pressing need for a more nuanced approach to understanding how 
individualism and collectivism matter both within as well as between societies. 
This need to unpack process raises the next question, which is to what extent dif-
ferences in values of individualism and collectivism matter for how individuals 
connect and relate to others, how they make sense of themselves, what constitute 
their bases of well-being, their motivations and how they process information 
about the world. Each of these issues is addressed briefl y in the next section. 
 RELATIONALITY 
 Quality of close relationships (family, intimate relationships), in-group–out-
group interactions (social behavior, communication style, confl ict resolution 
style), and groups in work or organizational contexts (working in groups, 
organizational confl ict management) were assessed in 71 studies ( Oyserman
et al., 2002a ). Effects were moderate-to-large in size, though variable. Broadly 
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FIGURE 11.1  Are Americans more individualistic and less collectivistic than others? Simultane-
ous mapping of effects sizes of comparisons between Anglo Americans, African Americans, Latino 
Americans and other regions of the world on individualism and collectivism.  Source : Adapted with per-
mission from  Oyserman et al. (2002a) . Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theo-
retical assumptions and meta-analyses. Psychological Bulletin, 128 , 3–73. Copyright 2002 American 
Psychological Association. Positive effect sizes refl ect higher Anglo American individualism and col-
lectivism; negative effect sizes refl ect lower Anglo American individualism and collectivism. Circles 
denote regional international comparisons, triangles denote within US comparisons. 
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speaking, these studies suggest that individualism and collectivism as cultural 
syndromes are associated with differences in relationality and group relations: 
individualism is associated with ease of interacting with strangers, preference for 
direct rather than indirect communication style; collectivism is associated with 
in-group preference in relationships and some forms of face saving. 
 SELF-CONCEPT 
 A total of 30 studies assessed self-concept related constructs (self-esteem, 
self-concept, or personality), and associated these with individualism and/or col-
lectivism. Research typically compared groups within United States or made 
comparisons between United States and another country group. In these studies, 
when cross-group differences were found, they were assumed to be due to indi-
vidualism and collectivism, but individualism and collectivism were not directly 
assessed. This is clearly a weak inferential basis. However, large effects were 
found in studies that did assess individualism and/or collectivism and then cor-
related levels of individualism and collectivism with content of self-concept, 
especially content describing the self in terms of in-group and collective member-
ships. Because research in this area is either correlational or lacks direct assess-
ment of individualism and collectivism, it remains open to criticism and awaits a 
more critical assessment of the claim that individualism and collectivism have a 
causal infl uence on content of self-concept. 
 WELL-BEING 
 Evidence from 29 studies on well-being and/or emotional expressiveness sug-
gested that  Hofstede’s (1980) individualism ratings for various countries tend to 
moderate the correlations between sources of satisfaction and general life sat-
isfaction, with higher correlations in higher individualism countries. However, 
individualism has an effect primarily in research that does  not control for country-
level differences on other variables (e.g., national wealth, civil rights, social 
comparison of income). Research controlling for these confounds shows smaller 
effect sizes attributable to individualism ( Arrindell et al., 1997 ). In terms of emo-
tional expression, effect sizes were generally large and positively associated with 
individualism. Other emotion-related analyses did not provide enough informa-
tion to calculate effect sizes. 
 COGNITIVE PROCESS 
 While research on content of self-concept and relationality support the notion 
that individualism and collectivism as cultural syndromes matter in everyday life, 
potential impact of culture on cognitive process is particularly intriguing (as noted 
by  Nisbett et al., 2001 ;  Norenzayan et al., 2007 ). In their review,  Oyserman et al. 
(2002a) summarized 40 studies on this topic, with 29 focusing on explanations, 
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6 on persuasion, and 5 on attributions about obligations. Americans were consist-
ently more likely to focus on dispositions than on situations in providing ration-
ales for behavior or explaining causality than were participants from non-Western 
countries. Where measured, individualism and collectivism appeared to mediate 
between-country effects, thus among Americans, individualism correlated with 
increased use of trait-based inference and decreased use of situation-cued recall 
( Newman, 1993 , Studies 1 and 2;  Duff  & Newman, 1997 , Studies 1 and 2). Where 
calculable, orthogonal and medium to large effect sizes were found for the infl u-
ences of individualism and collectivism on social cognition. In the past few years, 
evidence of cross-national differences between the United States, China ( Nisbett, 
2003 ), and Japan ( Kitayama et al., 2003 ) in non-social cognitive processes has 
emerged as well. This emerging research suggests that Americans are faster and 
more accurate in recall of abstract and central information, Chinese more accurate 
with details, background and elements of the whole, Japanese more accurate with 
proportions between elements (see  Norenzayan et al., 2007 , for a review). 
 MOTIVATION 
 Different cultural groups also appear to differ in chronic motivations. This 
has been assessed particularly in terms of differential salience of basic self-con-
cept goals and relational goals, comparing the United States and Canada with 
Japan, Korea, and China (between-countries) and comparing Anglo Americans 
with Asian Americans (within-U.S., between-ethnicities). Results suggest that 
self-consistency (being the same in different contexts) and self-enhancement 
(perceiving the self as positively as one can) are more salient self motives in 
North American contexts than in these other contexts but that effects may be due 
in part to a more salient relational goal of “ not offending others ” in these con-
texts. Specifi cally, compared to European Americans, Koreans are more likely to 
describe themselves differently in different contexts ( Suh, 2002 ) and mainland 
Chinese and Asian Americans are less interested in reducing these inconsisten-
cies ( Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004 ). US and Canadian self-images are system-
atically biased toward the positive end so that participants from these societies 
generally view themselves as better than others, but such self-enhancement bias is 
much weaker among Japanese participants ( Heine et al., 1999 ). This latter effect 
may be due to a relational motivation – to fi t in, be modest ( Heine, 2007 ), or not 
offend others ( Suzuki  & Yamagishi, 2004 ). Thus, US and Japanese respondents 
equally demonstrate implicit self-regard as revealed by semantic associations 
between positive evaluative judgment and the self ( Kitayama & Uchida, 2003 ).
However, positive self-evaluations are more suspect in Japanese contexts, so that 
Japanese participants do not explicitly report better-than-average self-ratings 
unless concern about offending others is overridden by research-induced incen-
tives (e.g., payment for accurate self-estimates,  Suzuki  & Yamagishi, 2004 ).
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 SOCIETIES VARY IN SALIENCE OF 
INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM IN 
VARIOUS SITUATIONS 
 How are these results to be interpreted? One possibility is that cultural syn-
dromes are based in distal cultural features such as philosophy, religion, or lan-
guage and that these features directly infl uence values, relationality, self-concept, 
well-being, cognitive style, and characteristic motivations. While initially plaus-
ible and certainly congruent with some approaches to cross-cultural difference 
(e.g.,  Nisbett, 2003 ), a number of studies suggest that distal features do not have 
a direct effect in and of themselves. Rather, features of the immediate situation 
are critical in turning on individualistic versus collectivistic cultural syndromes. 
In other words, empirical fi ndings suggest that culture may be better understood 
as situated cognition. 
 For example, a number of studies have used language as a proximal cue, with 
results of these studies suggesting that what language cues is dependent on the 
meaning of using that language in the particular experimental context. The same 
language can cue a more collective or a more individualistic response, depending 
on subjective meaning in context. Thus, two studies conducted in Hong Kong 
while it was still under British rule demonstrated higher endorsement of Chinese 
cultural values in Hong Kong Chinese students randomly assigned to fi ll out the 
questionnaire in English than in Chinese ( Yang  & Bond, 1980 ;  Bond  & Yang, 
1982 ). These studies suggest that feeling forced to use the out-group’s language 
can intensify in-group feelings. Conversely, two studies with immigrants and 
international students suggest that in contexts in which out-group language is felt 
to be chosen (rather than forced by colonial power), language used cues congru-
ent cultural syndrome. Thus, when Russian immigrants to the United States are 
randomly assigned to an all-English response format rather than an all-Russian 
response format, they are more likely to generate self- rather than other-focused 
memories ( Marian  & Kaushanskaya, 2004 ). Similarly, Chinese students studying 
in Canada do not differ in their responses to values and self-concept questions 
from European heritage Canadians when both groups are randomly assigned 
to respond in English, but do differ when randomly assigned to an all-Chinese 
response format ( Ross et al., 2002 ). 
 These results together suggest that cultural syndromes can be situationally 
primed in the moment, and that what comes to mind in the moment is that work-
ing subset of content and process knowledge relevant to the task at hand (see 
also  Oyserman et al., 2002b ). Rather than thinking of language or heritage or 
history as directly determining culturally characteristic content, cognitive, or 
motiv ational style, it is more plausible to think of these distal differences as 
infl uencing cognitive content, cognitive style and motivation indirectly, through 
their effect on the social structures and social situations individuals are likely to 
encounter. Social structures and situations likely in a society cue meaning for 
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individual participants (e.g.,  “ this is about separation, being unique ” ;  “ this is 
about connection, being part of a group ” ). 
 Because all cultures are rooted in evolutionary and natural selection and 
have the same adaptive needs, all societies likely provide suffi cient experience 
of both individualism and collectivism to allow either cultural syndrome to be 
primed when situationally relevant (see  Cohen, 2001 ;  Oyserman et al., 2002b ).
A society that did not have the potential to invoke group loyalty would not be 
likely to survive as a coherent whole over time, nor would a society that did not 
provide spaces for individual choice when group needs were met. Given the 
universality of both a basic sense of bodily and spatial-symbolic separateness 
( Burris  & Rempel, 2004 ) and a sense of social connectedness and need to belong 
( Baumeister  & Leary, 1995 ), it seems plausible that human minds are structured 
to see both separation and connection. 
 A graphic presentation of a working process model linking distal and prox imal
features of culture and their effects on psychologically meaningful outcomes – 
affect, behavior, and cognition – is displayed in  Figure 11.2 . As can be seen, 
distal culture is assumed to infl uence social structures, social situations and the 
norms and values likely to be internalized. But these are  not the proximal sources 
of infl uence on the subset of values, ways of understanding relationships, making 
meaning of the self, attitudes, judgments and style of thinking, and motivational 
goals likely to be on-line at any particular moment. Rather, as will be detailed 
below, these outcomes are most proximally infl uenced by how the situation is 
construed and this construal cues both content and process knowledge. 
 The notion that societies include both individualism and collectivism cultural 
syndromes differs from the initial view that societies high in individualism are 
necessarily low in collectivism and those high in collectivism are necessarily 
low in individualism. Though conceptualizing societies as including both indi-
vidualism and collectivism seems novel, quite a few scholars have advanced 
the idea that individualism and collectivism are not opposing ends of the same 
unidimensional cultural syndrome (e.g.,  Kagitçibasi, 1987 ;  Triandis et al., 1988 ;
 Bontempo, 1993 ;  Oyserman, 1993 ;  Singelis, 1994 ;  Sinha  & Tripathi, 1994 ;  Rhee 
et al., 1996 ;  Lehman et al., 2004 ). Each of the previously cited social scientists 
noted that a unidimensional model simply does not fi t the experience of living in 
a culture. Some suggest that individualism increases while collectivism remains 
viable in traditional societies that modernize (e.g.,  Kagitçibasi, 1987 ). Others 
suggest that individuals have both collectivist and individualist cognitive  “ bins ” 
that function separately (e.g.,  Triandis et al., 1988 ). 
 From a situated cognition perspective, all societies incorporate  both individu-
alism and collectivism so that both individualism and collectivism are enough 
part of the general cultural socialization process that when cued, each can come 
to mind. What differs across societies or cultures is the extent that individual-
ism or collectivism is likely to be made accessible or cued by proximal situa-
tions. This situated model is a better fi t to the evidence than a distal fi xed feature 
model and also allows for the use of experimental methods to gain insight into 
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FIGURE 11.2  Culture as situated cognition: Infl uencing what comes to mind, how one thinks, and what one is trying to do. Source : Adapted with permis-
sion from  Oyserman et al. (2002b) . Cultural psychology, a new look: Reply to Bond (2002), Fiske (2002), Kitayama (2002), and Miller (2002). Psychological 
Bulletin, 128 , 110–117. Copyright 2002 American Psychological Association. 
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situ ations that evoke cultural syndromes as well as the implications of evoking 
these syndromes. Such experimental evidence has been generated by a good 
number of studies that primed or made salient individualism and collectivism, to 
which we now turn. 
 PRIMING CULTURAL SYNDROME: CULTURE 
AS SITUATED COGNITION 
 The literature on priming has distinguished between conceptual priming, 
mindset priming, and goal priming ( Bargh  & Chartrand, 2000 ). In this section 
we fi rst ask why priming is useful in the study of culture. Then we briefl y out-
line each category of priming so that in the next section, results of culture-prim-
ing studies can be better understood. 
 WHY USE PRIMING? 
 Cross-national comparisons and studies using bilingual or bicultural partici-
pants provide a feel of ecological validity – they use real differences in where 
one lives and the language one speaks, and document an association between 
these differences and how individuals make sense of themselves and their social 
worlds and how they think more generally. However, these comparisons make it 
diffi cult to answer questions about the psychological mechanisms through which 
culture exerts its effects. Cross-national comparisons are diffi cult to interpret 
when differences are assumed to be due to cultural syndrome without measure-
ment; any and all differences may be attributed to  “ culture ” reducing the term 
to unwieldy vagueness. The alternative of using of bilingual or bicultural par-
ticipants is also not satisfying. When comparisons focus on distinct subgroups – 
those who are bilingual and/or bicultural, they do not allow clear generalization 
about the fl uidity of culture as a situated process; rather, they subtly reinforce 
the focus on culture as an “ in-the-head ” within-person variable like other traits 
or personality factors. Equally importantly, studies with bilingual and bicultural 
participants are mute as to whether individualism and collectivism are the active 
ingredients in observed differences and if so, which aspects of individualism and 
collectivism make a difference. 
 To answer these situated-process questions, it is necessary to experimentally 
manipulate the salience of components of individualism and collectivism and to 
compare effects of bringing active ingredients of these syndromes to mind. Indeed, 
an emerging body of literature involves the use of experimental techniques based 
in social cognition research to prime aspects of individualism or collectivism. By 
studying specifi cally primed active ingredients of cultural syndrome, the priming 
method can isolate particular effects on outcome measures of interest. 
 Generally, priming involves making content, procedures, and/or motivations 
temporarily accessible. The infl uence of construct accessibility on social perception 
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is well documented ( Higgins et al., 1977 ;  Higgins  & Bargh, 1987 ). Accessibility 
can be the temporary result of priming ( Srull  & Wyer, 1979, 1980 ) or a more 
chronic result of routine or habitual activation of a construct in one’s everyday 
environment ( Bargh, 1984, 2006 ;  Higgins, 1989, 1996 ). Temporary and chronic 
accessibility effects on social judgments are comparable in nature and additive 
in quantity ( Bargh et al., 1986 ;  Rudman  & Borgida, 1995 ). Recent priming and 
chronic activation are both predictive of construct accessibility. 
 In the laboratory, priming typically involves having participants engage in 
a series of tasks. Participants are not made aware of the researchers ’ intent to 
infl uence them. Unbeknownst to participants, the semantic content, procedural 
knowledge and goals cued by the fi rst task (prime) carries or  “ spills ” over to 
subsequent tasks (outcome measures). This spillover effect can be studied by 
comparing groups exposed to different fi rst tasks (priming stimuli). By compar-
ing spillover effects to cross-national differences, it is possible to test hypothe-
sized models of cultural infl uence on content, cognitive process and motivational 
style.
 Priming studies create an experimental analog of chronic differences between 
cultural groups by temporarily focusing participants ’ attention on culture-
relevant content (declarative knowledge), mindsets (procedural knowledge), 
and goals. By using a priming technique, culture-relevant values, norms, goals, 
beliefs, attitudes, cognitive and motivational styles can be cued automatically, 
simply because they were brought to mind by the previous task and without par-
ticipants ’ awareness. Rather than simply compare groups, priming requires an a 
priori commitment to an active ingredient of individualistic and/or collectivistic 
cultural syndrome to be cued. By comparing responses to individualism- versus 
collectivism-primed conditions against hypothesized differences between indi-
vidualism and collectivism, researchers can examine the extent that hypothesized 
differences between cultures are actually due to the primed active ingredients of 
cultural syndrome. Experiments also provide the possibility of studying whether 
effects associated with one society (e.g., individualism and the United States) 
can just as well occur in another when primed (e.g., effects of priming individu-
alism in China). 
 Of course, priming can only make accessible that which is available in mind. 
Like all priming methods, cultural-syndrome priming tasks can only be effective 
if semantic content, procedural mindset knowledge and motivations relevant to 
each construct is available to be primed. One cannot be individualism-primed 
if one has available in memory only collectivism-relevant semantic and proced-
ural knowledge and goals; similarly one cannot be collectivism-primed if one 
has available in memory only individualism-relevant semantic and procedural 
knowledge and goals. Thus, for cultural syndrome priming to be effective, a 
basic assumption is that across societies and cultures, individuals are capable of 
thinking about themselves and the world as both separate and independent and 
as connected and interdependent even if they are typically likely to focus on one 
or the other and likely to be habitually motivated to self-present or self-efface. 
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 CONCEPTUAL PRIMING 
 Conceptual priming involves activation of specifi c mental representations such 
as traits, values, norms, or goals which then serve as interpretive frames in the 
processing of subsequent information ( Higgins, 1996 ). Once a concept is primed, 
other concepts associated with it in memory are activated through spreading acti-
vation ( Neely, 1977 ). Following this line of reasoning, average between-society or 
between racial-ethnic group differences attributed to differences in cultural syn-
drome may be due to differences in the conceptual networks primed in everyday 
situations. Objects and practices continually activate corresponding culturally mean-
ingful thoughts. Different cultural syndromes may therefore prime different cogni-
tive contents by creating differing content and associative networks that together 
infl uence what we think about ourselves, about others, and about the world. 
 MINDSET PRIMING 
 Mindset priming involves activation of a previously stored mental procedure or 
way of making sense of the world in one context that is carried over into another 
( Bargh  & Chartrand, 2000 ). For example, when primed to think either about 
whether to engage in a goal or  how to engage in a goal, participants later use this 
same thinking style in a second unrelated task (e.g.,  Gollwitzer et al., 1990 ). Mindset 
priming is consistent with the general assumption that processing strategies are situ-
ated and tuned to meet current situational requirements (for a review, see  Schwarz, 
2002, 2006 ). These processing strategies or procedures can be thought of as part 
of a procedural toolkit used to structure thinking and reasoning about the world. 
 MINDSETS AND CULTURE 
 Markus and Oyserman (1989) proposed that women and individuals from 
non-Western societies are more likely to view themselves as importantly con-
nected and that, in contrast, men and individuals from Western societies are 
more likely to view themselves as importantly separate from others. They argued 
that basic cognitive procedures are associated with these divergent basic self-
schemas: connected self-schemas cue a connecting and integrating cognitive 
style; separated self-schemas cue a separating and distinguishing cognitive style. 
These arguments were refi ned by  Markus and Kitayama (1991) in their follow-
up review in which connected self-schemas were termed interdependent self-
construals and separate self-schemas were termed independent self-construals, 
with the proposal that this difference in self-concept is true of average differ-
ences between Eastern and Western self-construals.  Cross and Madson (1997) 
made the same argument for gender (for a different perspective on gender and 
culture, see  Kashima et al., 1995 ). 
 Following these initial reviews of the literature, empirical work demonstrat-
ing the association of “ separate ” and  “ connected ” self-schemas with preference 
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for “ separating ” and  “ connecting ” cognitive processes was carried out by Woike, 
Lavezzary, and Barksy ( Woike, 1994 ;  Woike et al., 2001 ) and by Hannover, 
Kühnen, and colleagues (e.g.,  Kühnen et al., 2001 ;  Kühnen  & Oyserman, 2002 ;
 Hannover  & Kühnen, 2004 ). Woike and her colleagues follow the terminol-
ogy of  Bakan (1966) and describe connected self-schemas as communion self-
concepts and separate self-schemas as agency self-concepts and term the rele-
vant preferred cognitive processes integration and distinction, respectively. The 
cognitive procedure chronically preferred by those with an agentic self-schema 
is to distinguish or separate while the cognitive procedure chronically preferred 
by those with a communal or connected self-schema is to connect and inte-
grate. Hannover, Kühnen, and colleagues (e.g.,  Kühnen et al., 2001 ;  Kühnen  &
Oyserman, 2002 ;  Hannover  & Kühnen, 2004 ) describe differences in procedures 
associated with independent and interdependent self-representations using prim-
ing procedures to demonstrate effects on cognitive process. 
 GOAL PRIMING 
 Motivations or goals can also be primed. The priming literature has not con-
sistently separated priming of goals or motivation from priming of content. This 
makes sense because a goal is a representation of a desired end state and in that 
sense includes content ( Bargh, 1990 ). However, goals can also be thought of as 
processes, in that strategies and a general array of procedures are necessary to 
attain the end state represented in a goal (e.g.,  Gollwitzer  & Moskowitz, 1996 ;
 Kruglanski, 1996 ). Thus, goals can be thought of as a mix of content and mega-
procedures. Indeed, goals-and-means networks overlap with semantic networks 
( Bargh  & Chartrand, 2000 ;  Förster et al., 2007 ). Like content and procedures, 
once stored in memory, goals can be primed without explicit, conscious inten-
tion formation ( Chartrand  & Bargh, 1996 ). For example,  Bargh et al. (1995) and 
 Chen et al. (2001) exposed participants in the lab to words associated with pos-
session of power and found that this manipulation activated specifi c, individual-
ized goals associated with power which infl uenced participants ’ perception and 
behavior. Priming power made salient sexualized images of women among men 
chronically likely to sexually harass ( Bargh et al., 1995 ). But priming power 
made salient social responsibility among individuals high in communal orienta-
tion ( Chen et al., 2001 ).
 EFFECTS HYPOTHESIZED BY A SITUATED 
COGNITION MODEL OF CULTURE 
 The proposed culture-as-situated-cognition model suggests that priming indi-
vidualism will evoke individualism-relevant content, mindset, and goals in both 
men and women across diverse societies. Five broad areas of content knowledge 
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are proposed to be cued when individualism, rather than collectivism is primed. 
Priming individualism will 
 1.  Enhance endorsement of individualistic values and dampen endorsement 
of relational or collective values. 
 2.  Make unique traits and attribute-based elements of self-concept more 
accessible and social or relational-based elements of self-concept less 
accessible .
 3.  Dampen felt closeness and obligation to in-group others and reduce 
sensitivity to their needs and goals. 
 4.  Enhance the accessibility of well-being based in happiness, self-
fulfi llment, and personal success and dampen the accessibility of well-
being based in fulfi lling social obligations and commitments, providing 
refl ectable glory for in-group members and basking in the refl ected glory 
of other in-group members. 
 5.  Make messages focused on the self, difference, and uniqueness more 
believable and persuasive than messages focused on the group, similarity 
and connection. 
In terms of cued procedural knowledge, the model proposes that compared to 
when collectivism is primed, priming individualism will enhance the accessibil-
ity of pull-apart and separate processing strategies (and dampen accessibility of 
connect and integrate processing strategies). In terms of cued motivations, the 
model proposes that compared to when collectivism is primed, priming individu-
alism will make certain self (self-enhancement and self-consistency) and rela-
tional (be competent, be equitable) goals more salient and other relational goals 
(do not offend others, maintain harmony) less salient. 
 META-ANALYSES OF CULTURAL SYNDROME 
PRIMING LITERATURE 
 Oyserman and Lee (2008) reviewed the priming literature through January 1, 
2005, obtaining 67 studies conducted in three regions (and eight countries) 
that prime individualism and collectivism cultural syndromes and assessed 
effects on values, relationality, self-concept, well-being, and cognition. They 
found a signifi cant and meaningful overall effect of cultural syndrome prim-
ing (mean unweighted d  "  0.45, mean weighted  d  "  0.34, Confi dence Interval 
(CI)  "  0.29/0.39). This average effect was comparable across the three most 
common cultural syndrome priming tasks (pronoun circling, Brewer  & Gardner, 
1996 ; thinking about similarities/differences with family and friends [SDFF] and 
Sumerian warrior story,  Trafi mow et al., 1991 ) and when the same priming tasks 
are used, effects are in the same range for both European/European American 
samples and for Asian (primarily Hong Kong Chinese) samples. 
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 Among these 67 studies,  Oyserman and Lee (2008) examined those that 
reported comparison to control condition to provide an estimate of whether 
priming moves responses of those primed with individualism, those primed with 
collectivism, or both groups equally. They found 14 studies that included a com-
parison with control, reporting small-to-moderate effect sizes in both directions 
when individualism was compared with control,  d  "  0.35, CI  "  0.23/0.48; when 
collectivism was compared with control,  d  "  0.34, CI  "  0.21/0.46. They also 
note that in currently used individualism and collectivism primes there seems to 
be a trade-off in priming effectiveness. Primes that involve relational priming 
tasks such as SDFF or pronoun circling task, are not as effective in cuing collec-
tivism ( d  "  0.23) as they are in cuing individualism ( d  "  0.43), at least among 
the samples tested so far. Similarly, priming tasks that include both relational 
and collective-group collectivism primes (e.g., Trafi mow et al.’s Sumerian 
Warrior task) are not as effective at cuing individualism ( d  "  0.25) as they are 
at cuing collectivism ( d  "  0.48). Unfortunately, results are sample-dependent 
and not all primes have been used in every society. However, results are prom-
ising as they provide support to the situated cognition model’s prediction that 
both individualism and collectivism can be activated and infl uence psychologi-
cal outcomes. Though to be sure, they also call for an expanded set of priming 
tasks in order to better understand active ingredients of both individualism and 
collectivism. 
 In their fi nal set of analyses, Oyserman and Lee (2007b) also examined 
results from 32 other studies that primed individualism or collectivism (but not 
both) and compared the primed groups to various control or comparison groups. 
Taken as a whole these additional studies show effects consistent with those 
found in the main meta-analysis comparing both individualism and collectivism. 
This suggests that results are robust to differences in methodology and study 
quality. 
 Cultural syndrome primes are diverse in task type, content, and transpar-
ency (i.e., the likelihood that what is being primed is plausibly clear to the par-
ticipant). In combination with the general stability of fi ndings across primes, this 
diversity is helpful because it constitutes strong evidence that effects are due 
to an underlying process rather than due to the specifi cs of a particular prime. 
The only priming task that produced widely varying results was use of lan-
guage as a prime (with effects in the hypothesized direction in some studies and 
effects in the opposite direction in others, overall  d  "  0.10). As noted by recent 
reviews (e.g.,  Chiu et al., 2007 ;  Norenzayan et al., 2007 ;  Wang  & Ross, 2007 ),
language is related to culture, memory, and cognition. While studies using lan-
guage are limited to participants who are bi- or multilingual, potential effects 
of language can be operationalized and studied with other primes, thus disen-
tangling language from other culture-relevant factors. Our interpretation of the 
near zero average effect of language-priming is that the meaning of language 
is highly contextualized (see earlier discussion in Societies Vary in Salience of 
Individualism and Collectivism in Various Situations section). 
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 EFFECTS OF PRIMING CULTURAL SYNDROMES ON 
CULTURE-RELEVANT CONTENT 
 Effects in the priming literature are consistent with those in the cross-national 
literature, in the expected direction across outcome domains, with moderate 
effects on both relationality and cognition, and small effects on values, well-
being and self-concept. Effects for values are stronger when known measures 
of individualism or collectivism are used. With regard to self-concept, effects 
are stronger when effects on private or collective self-concept are examined; 
no effect on relational self-concept content was found. Effects are particu-
larly robust for relationality, not only large in size, but also internally homoge-
neous across various priming tasks and outcome measures. This robust fi nding 
is important because, along with values, how one relates to others is central to 
many operationalizations of cultural difference. Therefore the large and homo-
geneous effect size suggests that priming cultural syndrome systematically shifts 
which way of engaging others is cued. 
 EFFECTS OF PRIMING CULTURAL SYNDROMES ON 
COGNITIVE PROCESS 
 Each of the priming tasks  Oyserman and Lee (2008) describe clearly involves 
a conceptual prime, that is, the task and task instructions prime words related 
to individualism and collectivism. These are likely to bring to mind relevant 
content in the form of values, ways of being a self, ways of engaging with 
others and ways of making sense of the world. None of the tasks or instructions 
is explicitly process oriented – participants are  not told to connect or pull apart, 
assimilate or contrast. Two key questions then are: Do these tasks nonetheless 
prime procedural knowledge – separating out and focusing on a main object 
versus connecting, integrating, and focusing on the whole. And second, does 
priming procedural knowledge infl uence  how (not only  what ) we think, feel and 
act. Thus when words like  separate ,  different ,  dissociate , or words like  simi-
lar ,  connect ,  together are used in instructions or in the task itself, do they prime 
mindsets rather than simply content knowledge? And if mindsets are primed, 
is there evidence that they infl uence cognition, affect and behavior? In the next 
section, we summarize  Oyserman and Lee’s (2008) results as relevant to this 
question.
 Of the 28 studies  Oyserman and Lee (2008) coded as focused on cogni-
tion, about a third focused on cognitive content (attitudes and judgment) 
and the remaining two thirds focus on cognitive process in social and nonso-
cial domains. Across each domain, effect size was moderate ( d  #  0.50). These 
results suggest that priming cultural syndrome does prime a style of thinking in 
both social and non-social domains. These results were not moderated by gen-
der or region. Priming collectivism made it more likely that men and women,
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Europeans/European Americans and Asians would use a  “ connect and relate ” 
mindset; priming individualism made it more likely that men and women, Asians 
and Europeans would use a  “ pull-apart and separate ” mindset. For example, col-
lectivism priming improves recall for spatial position of a random array of objects 
and speed of recognition of a big letter made up of little letters ( Kühnen  &
Oyserman, 2002 ); individualism priming improves accuracy in an embedded 
fi gures task ( Kühnen et al., 2001 ). 
 In addition, a number of studies examine microprocesses within the cultural 
syndrome priming tasks. Following up on their initial fi nding that collectivism 
priming cues assimilation and individualism priming cues contrast, Stapel and 
Koomen (2001 , Study 4) asked why contrast effects were signifi cant only when 
the contrast favored self-enhancement. They decomposed the effect of their prior 
priming using fi rst person pronouns and showed that fi rst person pronouns cues 
self-enhancement among Dutch participants but that separation and distinction 
can be cued separately from self-enhancement. 
 EFFECTS OF PRIMING CULTURAL SYNDROMES 
ON GOALS 
 While less examined, as demonstrated in the Stapel and Koomen (2001) 
research summarized above, it seems plausible that priming cultural syndromes 
should also prime culturally relevant goals and motives. Integrating and synthe-
sizing prior research, it seems reasonable to argue that self-enhancement and 
self-consistency motives ( Swann, 1985 ;  Taylor  & Brown, 1988 ), competence 
and leadership goals, and relational principles that emphasize individual bene-
fi t (e.g., fairness, equality matching) and competition for success (e.g., market 
pricing; Fiske, 1991 ) should all be cued at least in some circumstances, by
individualism. With the group taking primacy, collectivism should be likely to 
prime self-effacement and self-improvement motives ( Heine, 2003, 2005 ), har-
mony-building goals and strategies (e.g., loyalty, modesty, not offending others, 
protecting face;  Yamagishi  & Suzuki , in press), as well as relational princi-
ples that emphasize collective benefi t (e.g., communal sharing;  Fiske, 1991 ). 
Theorizing along these lines,  Oyserman et al. (1998) varied the salience of indi-
vidualism and collectivism and found that both Jewish and Asian American par-
ticipants were faster and more confi dent in choosing to help others at the cost 
of their own goals across a variety of scenarios when relevant cultural values 
were primed and endorsed. Specifi cally, helping in-group others increased when 
cultural values were primed and collectivism was highly endorsed, whereas 
helping broader society others increased when cultural values were primed and 
both collectivism and individualism were highly endorsed. Results suggest that 
different forms of obligation are salient when one is reminded of one’s values 
and these values refl ect individualism, collectivism, or both individualism and 
collectivism. 
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 These results were conceptually replicated by  Gardner et al. (1999, Study 1) ,
who found that compared to those primed with individualism, people primed 
with collectivism perceive a target person as more obligated to help a close friend. 
Similarly,  Gardner et al. (2004) found that individualism-primed participants 
were more oriented toward self-goals but collectivism-primed participants were 
more oriented toward group-goals. The effect of priming was robust across Anglo 
American and Asian American participants (for similar fi ndings, see  Utz, 2004a, 
b ;  Wenzel, 2002 ). Collectivism-primed motivation to support group goals was also 
found by  Gardner et al. (2002) ,who found that mismatch between  own and  group’s
perfor mance produced opposite effects among individualism-primed, compared 
with collectivism-primed, participants. Individualism-primed participants reported 
more positive mood when their own performance was good (and their group’s was 
not good). Collectivism-primed participants reported more positive mood when 
their group’s performance was good (and their own performance was not good). 
 The effects of priming on group-focused motivation have also been studied 
with regard to endorsement of social justice relevant attitudes.  Kemmelmeier 
(2003) primed participants with individualism by having them circle singular 
fi rst-person pronouns ( I ,  me ,  my ,  mine , Study 1) or read and rephrase a paragraph 
revolving around the theme of personal freedom (Study 2) and compared results 
to participants primed with collectivism (Study 1, circling plural fi rst-person 
pronouns we ,  us ,  our ,  ours ; Study 2, read and rephrase a paragraph revolving 
around the theme of family commonality). In both cases, collectivism-primed 
participants favored affi rmative action more than individualism-primed partici-
pants and individualism-primed participants favored equal opportunity more than 
collectivism-primed participants. It is possible to interpret these results in terms 
of shifting relational goals, with ending in the same place being more important 
for those primed with collectivism and beginning at the same place being more 
important for those primed with individualism. 
 BUT WHICH GOALS ARE PRIMED? 
 Existing fi ndings seem to support the general contention that cultural syndrome 
primes activate culturally prescribed goals and accordingly, direct motivated rea-
soning and actions: individualism-primed people are more motivated for equality 
and individual-focused fairness; collectivism-primed people are more motivated for 
group benefi ts and helping in-group others in society. Indeed, these fi ndings were 
described by the original authors in terms of goals or in similar motivational terms. 
However, aside from the suggestive research summarized above, the priming lit-
erature has yet to provide the type of motivation-focused evidence provided in the 
cross-national literature (e.g., Yamagishi  & Suzuki , in press). That is, while cross-
national studies such as those summarized below strongly suggest differences in 
chronic relational motivation, priming studies have yet to demonstrate that these 
motivations can be turned on and have the same effects across national groups. 
 In their cross-national studies,  Yamagishi and Suzuki (in press) demon-
strate that Japan–United States differences in choices and in how modest one is 
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in one ’ s self reports of successes, skills, and abilities can be made to disappear 
when differences relational motivation is taken into account. First, they provide 
a conceptual replication of  Kim and Markus’s (1999) fi ndings.  Kim and Markus 
(1999) showed differences between Asian (Chinese American, Koreans, East 
Asian Americans) and European American participants in their choice of a com-
mon or uncommon pen in an array of pens provided as a gift. While Kim and 
Markus attribute choice difference to difference in preference for uniqueness, 
Yamgagishi and Suzuki disagree with their interpretation and argue that the dif-
ference in choice was due to difference in relational goals. They argue that Asian 
participants simply did not want to offend others by making a choice that would 
inconvenience others (taking an uncommon pen might mean that others would 
not have access to this choice). They demonstrate that the initial effect remains 
when Japanese participants are told that they are making the fi rst choice and that 
others will choose later, but disappears when Japanese participants are told that 
they are making the last choice and no one will follow. If there is no one to be 
offended, that is, when they are last, they can and do take the uncommon pen. 
 Suzuki and Yamagishi (2004) also show that what would otherwise appear to 
be a goal of modesty also seems to be part of the “ not offend others ” goal. First, 
they replicate prior research showing greater modesty in Japanese than American 
respondents: only a third of Japanese but 70% of Americans estimate that their 
achievement test performance is better than average. Then they demonstrate that 
the Japanese but not the Americans shift their responses when told that they will 
be paid for accurate responses, in which case Japanese are just as self-enhancing 
as are Americans. Yamagishi and colleagues argue that these results suggest that 
the chronic “ not offend others ” motivation is turned off only when it is clear that 
others will not be offended. Their results mesh well with research by Kitayama 
( Kitayama  & Karasawa, 1997 ;  Kitayama  & Uchida, 2003 ) demonstrating that 
Japanese do not differ in their implicit self-regard, but rather in their willingness 
to express positive self-regard openly. When social situations are ambiguous – as 
they generally are – Japanese are more likely to assume by default the presence 
of others and are motivated not to offend others by conforming to the majority, 
sharing and being modest. Conversely, in ambiguous situations, such relational 
motives are not cued in Americans, allowing free reign for self-enhancement 
and authority-asserting motivations. These results are highly relevant, but with-
out experimental manipulation, it is impossible to tell if these effects are part 
of the active ingredients of individualism and collectivism or due to some other 
differences between Japanese and American societies. As demonstrated in these 
studies, if culture-congruent self or relational motivation processes are ignored, 
effects may be misinterpreted. 
 AN INTEGRATION 
 We have provided evidence that a situated cognition approach to culture is 
necessary and that a situated model highlights how culture infl uences cognitive 
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content (what), cognitive process (how), and motivation (for what purpose). 
While cross-national comparisons can be high in ecological validity (because 
they demonstrate real differences between real groups), these studies are lim-
ited in other ways. Reliance on survey response leaves open questions about 
interpretability of comparisons and studies that lack experimental manipulation 
cannot illuminate the process by which culture matters, leaving as a black box 
the mechanism through which culture infl uences individuals. To address these 
problems, social cognition research provides content, mindset and potentially, 
goal priming as tools to assess the impact of some key aspects of cultural 
syndromes.
 Oyserman et al.’s (2002a) meta-analyses of cross-national comparisons 
between Anglo or European Americans and others suggests a moderate sized 
difference in endorsement of individualism and collectivism values with some 
caveats.  Oyserman and Lee’s (2007, 2008) follow-up meta-analyses and review 
of the cultural syndrome priming literature suggests that expressed endorsement 
of individualism and collectivism values is sensitive to situational priming, and 
that across priming tasks, effects are moderate in size when the kinds of value 
scales used in the cross-national literature are employed. Priming cultural syn-
drome shifts salience of individualism and collectivism values with about the 
same magnitude of effect as is found in the cross-national literature. When stud-
ies used comparison with control, effects were found for both individualism and 
collectivism priming. 
 With regard to effects of cultural syndrome priming on content and process 
of thinking, we fi nd evidence that priming cultural syndrome infl uences mind-
set. Thus, collectivism priming increases likelihood of including rather than 
excluding information, resulting in assimilating information about another into 
one’s self-rating, while individualism priming increases likelihood of contrasting 
information about another with one’s self-rating – using the other as a stand-
ard rather than as part of oneself. Moreover, cultural syndrome priming shifts 
use of pull-apart versus integrate-and-connect processes even for non-social 
cognitive tasks. Thus, collectivism priming relative to individualism priming 
shifts speed of recognition of embedded fi gures, of letters made up of other let-
ters and speed in the Stroop Task (e.g.,  Kühnen  & Oyserman, 2002 ;  Oyserman 
et al., 2008 ). These effects parallel cross-national effects found by  Norenzayan
et al. (2007) ,  Nisbett (2003) , and  Kitayama et al. (2003) . 
 Both cross-national and priming literatures suggest moderate-to-large effects 
of individualism and collectivism on ways of engaging with others. Some of 
these studies seem to be priming culturally relevant relational goals such as 
desire for personal achievement, relationship building, and collective suc-
cess. While the cross-national literature documented apparent goal differences 
between a good number of countries, the cultural syndrome priming literature 
on relationality is mostly limited to Western samples. We found only one study 
assessing effects of cultural syndrome priming on relationality using an Asian 
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American sample ( Gardner et al., 2004 ), suggesting a need for further research 
in other regions of the world. That said, the fact that effects of cultural syndrome 
priming on both individualism-collectivism values and social-relational engage-
ment parallels cross-national differences affords important ecological valid-
ity to priming as a way of isolating the active ingredients of cultural syndrome 
( Oyserman  & Sorensen, in press ).
 Our review supports the cross-cultural psychological contention that culture 
matters – infl uencing how the self is defi ned, how relationships with others are 
imagined, what is of value and how the mind works – and more importantly, 
moves beyond this general framework by suggesting that culture matters  because
it situates cognition . Culture makes certain ways of being in the world  “ go with-
out ” saying because they have been brought to mind without conscious aware-
ness. That is, priming culture-relevant content shows a clear impact on accessible 
cultural knowledge resulting in shifting values, altered self-descriptions, and dif-
ferences in understanding about one’s social obligations and relations with oth-
ers. These fi ndings suggest that culture is a conceptual prime, activating relevant 
knowledge. Perhaps more intriguingly, priming infl uences situated cognitive 
processes as well. That is, priming different cultural syndromes makes accessi-
ble different procedural knowledge. The mindset of individualism is to pull apart 
and separate, to contrast fi gure from ground, self from other. The mindset of col-
lectivism is to connect and integrate, to assimilate fi gure with ground, self with 
other. These fi ndings suggest that culture is also a procedural prime, activating 
relevant naïve theories as to how to make meaning. 
 Evidence thus supports a situated cognition model of culture that is applicable 
to both “ East ” and  “ West. ” Far from being immutable, cultural differences are 
malleable in the moment. Because cultural syndrome priming can be understood 
as setting up a situation that cues isolated active ingredients of culture, the evi-
dence that cultural syndrome priming is effective suggests that in everyday life 
such malleability is also plausible. Subtle priming evokes subjective construals 
that afford and elicit culturally meaningful and relevant thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors. Thus, despite the phenomenal experience of culture as natural, real, 
and immutable, cultural meanings and cultural differences are likely to be fl uid. 
Such fl uidity is grounded in the notion that culturally situated reasoning is action 
based, that is, the situation cues what is relevant to making meaning and tak-
ing action in the moment (see  Smith  & Semin, 2004 ). The fi nding that cultural 
syndrome priming infl uences both content and process is particularly important 
because procedural knowledge or naïve theories about how to process informa-
tion and make meaning of meta-cognitive experience matter for the sense we 
make of ourselves and others, goal-pursuit and inter-group dialogue. 
 Clearly there is much to be done. Priming research does not yet include 
regions of the world such as Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. To 
understand more about the underlying process, to make predictions with regard 
to differences in real groups (other than college students) and population, it will 
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be necessary to conduct at least some priming research off college campuses. 
Good cultural syndrome primes should provide the ability to test effects within 
and across countries and to test effects with non-college student participants. 
Use of varied primes is recommended as none alone should be assumed to fully 
embody the latent construct of “ culture ” or even its active ingredients. The 
general argument that cultural syndromes are situated cognition – that cultural 
syndromes work by cuing cognitive content and cognitive style, which in turn 
infl uence what and how we think – is greatly strengthened by robustness of fi nd-
ings across tasks, regions, and outcome variables. 
 Taken together, evidence suggests that the situated cognition model provides 
an excellent starting point for future research: Expanding beyond individualism 
and collectivism is likely to provide new insights by providing additional ways 
of identifying active ingredients of culture. As we have argued, meanings in situ-
ation matter because culture is a form of situated cognition that provides cues as 
to who one is, what is meaningful and desirable, and how to process informa-
tion about the world. While not initially salient, research on motivational proc-
esses is beginning to emerge. This work promises to better situate what content 
and processes come to mind when active ingredients of culture are primed. By 
articulating what turns on culturally characteristic motivations and studying the 
extent that these motivations map on to individualism and collectivism or other 
cultural syndrome models, research on the interface between culture and motiva-
tional processes provides a new frontier on cultural psychology. 
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